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Recent Developments 
ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc.: 
Technology Cannot Eviscerate Constitutional Limits on State Power to Exercise 
Jurisdiction Over a Defendant 
In a case offirst impression, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held 
technology could not eviscerate 
constitutional limits on a State's power 
to exercise jurisdiction over a 
defendant living outside ofthe State. 
ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Servo 
Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707 
(2002). In so holding, the court ruled 
the district court could not, consistent 
with due process, exercise judicial 
power over an out-of-state entity that 
caused injury in Maryland through 
electronica1lytransmitting information 
via the Internet. Id 
ALS Scan, Inc. ("ALS"), a 
corporation located in Columbia, 
Maryland, created and marketed 
adult photographs for distribution over 
the Internet. Digital Service Con-
sultants ("Digital"), a Georgia 
corporation, operated as an Internet 
Service Provider ("ISP") for 
Alternative Products, Inc., ("Alt-
ernative"), an Internet advertising and 
sales company. ALS asserted that 
Digital, together with Alternative, 
appropriated copies of hundreds of 
ALS' copyrighted photographs and 
placed them on its web sites , thereby 
gaining revenue from them through 
membership fees and advertising. 
ALS thus averred that Digital and 
Alternative had infringed its copyrights 
within Maryland and elsewhere by 
selling, publishing, and displaying its 
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copyrighted photographs. 
ALS commenced an action for 
copyright infringement against Digital 
in the United States District Court for 
the District of Maryland. Digital filed 
a motion to dismiss under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), 
asserting the district court lacked 
personal jurisdiction. The court 
granted Digital's motion. ALS 
thereafter appealed. The court 
accepted the appeal to determine 
whether a person electronically 
transmitting information via the 
Internet to Maryland, whereby 
causing injury in the State, is subject 
to the jurisdiction of a Maryland 
district court. 
The court began its analysis by 
recognizing that applying traditional 
due process principles governing a 
State's jurisdiction over persons 
outside the State based on Internet 
activity required "some adaptation of 
those principles, [as] the Internet is 
omnipresent. ALS Scan, 293 F.3d 
707 at 712. The court concluded, "as 
a general principle, [if] a person's act 
of placing information on the Internet 
subjects that person to personal 
jurisdiction in each state in which the 
information is accessed, [then the 
fundamental concept] that a state has 
geographically limited judicial power, 
would no longer exist." Id. 
Consequently, the court opined 
that, "under current Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, despite advances in 
technology, State judicial power over 
persons appears to remain limited" 
[to two types]. Id. at 712. These 
limitations encompass persons within 
the State's boundaries as well as 
those outside ofthe State, but who 
have established minimum contacts 
with the State. Id. 
The court further reasoned that 
until the due process concept of 
personal jurisdiction is reconceived 
and rearticulated by the Supreme 
Court addressing increases in 
technology, a new standard must be 
developed. Id. The court resolved 
that this new standard should set forth 
limited circumstances when it can be 
determined that an out-of-state entity, 
"through electronic contacts, has 
conceptually entered . . . and 
established those minimum contacts 
in the ... state via the Internet for 
jurisdictional pmposes." Id. 
Focusing on the requirements 
for establishing specific jurisdiction, 
which necessitate.s purposeful 
conduct directed at the State, and 
that the plaintiff's claims aro,se from 
that purposeful conduct, the court 
adopted the model set forth in Zippo 
Mfg. CO. V. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 
952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 714. In 
Zippo, the court concluded that "the 
likelihood that personal jurisdiction 
can be constitutionally exercised is 
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directly proportionate to the nature 
and quality of commercial activity that 
an entity conducts over the Internet." 
Id. (quoting Zippo Mfg. Co. v. 
Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 
1119,1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
The Zippo model concentrated 
on differentiating between those 
websites that are "active" and sub-
sequently susceptible to creating 
jurisdiction, and those websites that 
are passive, which do not generate 
personal jurisdiction over the out-of-
state entity. ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 
714. With these guidelines, the court 
resolved that the exercise of 
jurisdiction is determined by ex-
amining the level of Internet activity 
that occurs and the nature of the 
commercial exchange of information 
on the website. Id. The court 
concluded that if a defendant enters 
into contracts with residents of a 
foreign jurisdiction that involve the 
knowing and repeated transmission of 
files over the Internet, those acts 
involve an "active" website -- thereby 
creating personal jurisdiction. Id In 
contrast, the court declared that a 
passive website that does little more 
than make information available to 
those who are interested in it, is not 
grounds for the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction. Id 
In adopting the Zippo model, 
the court set forth that a "State may, 
consistent with due process, exercise 
judicial power over a person outside 
the State when that person (1) directs 
electronic activity into the State; (2) 
with the manifested intent of engaging 
in business or other interactions within 
the state; and (3) that activity creates, 
in a person within that State, a 
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potential cause of action cognizable 
in the State's courts." Id. Under these 
guidelines, the court ruled that a 
person who simply places information 
on the Internet does not subject 
himself to jurisdiction in each State 
into which the electronic signal is 
transmitted and received. Id 
Applying the new standard, the 
court concluded that Digital's activity 
was, at most, passive, and therefore 
did not trigger the exercise of judicial 
power of a Maryland court. ALS 
Scan, 293 F.3d at 714. The court 
further reasoned that Digital did not 
direct its electronic activity specifically 
at any target in Maryland; it did not 
manifest an intent to engage in a 
business or some other interaction in 
Maryland; and none of its conduct in 
creating a website necessitated a cause 
of action in Maryland. Id at 715. 
The decision of ALS Scan, 
promulgates that many courts have 
recognized that the standards used to 
determine the proper exercise of 
personal jurisdiction may evolve as 
technology progresses. However, the 
decision ensures that it will nonetheless 
remain clear that technology cannot 
bulldoze the constitutional walls that 
limit a state's power to exercise 
jurisdiction over an entity. 
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